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Reply

A Response to Appleton and Pollak
I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen†
We view Professor Appleton and Professor Pollak’s response to our article, Trading-Off Reproductive Technology and
Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and
Should It Matter?, as “complementary” in two senses.1 First,
they are extremely generous with their praise for our project,
which is particularly gratifying given how important their own
work has been in the field. Second, and perhaps more importantly, they suggest a number of new tangents and ideas
prompted by our project. We first summarize those contributions and how we think they fit with our Article. We then very
briefly discuss a few instances where we might characterize
what we have said differently than they do.
Appleton and Pollak add a number of distinct contributions
to what we have said. They nicely suggest that the rhetorical
and legal relationship between embryo adoption and child
adoption is worth further study.2 While one of us has written
extensively about reproductive technologies and the legal and
ethical issues they raise,3 neither in this paper nor in that prior
† Copyright © 2012 by I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen.
1. See I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen, Trading-Off Reproductive
Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and
Should It Matter?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 485 (2010).
2. Susan Frelich Appleton & Robert A. Pollak, Exploring the Connections
Between Adoption and IVF: Twibling Analyses, 95 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES
60, 66–69 (2011), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/
05/Appleton-Pollak_PDF.pdf.
3. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. _
(forthcoming 2012) ( proposing substitutes for BIRC analysis); I. Glenn Cohen,
Intentional Diminishment, The Non-Identity Problem, and Legal Liability, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 347 (2008) (discussing tort liability for parents who use reproductive technologies to intentionally produce disabled children); I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L.
REV. 423 (forthcoming 2011) ( problematizing best-interests-of-the-resultingchild (BIRC) analysis by examining it within the context of modern reproductive technologies); I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Pro-
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work have we examined embryo adoption—although its omission in this paper is, in part, a function of the inability to distinguish it within the CDC data set with which we conduct our
empirical work. In any event, we wholeheartedly agree with
Appleton and Pollak that it deserves considerable further
study.
At the end of our Article we frame a research agenda based
on our results: “[W]hy do complete mandates not reduce nonrelated domestic or international adoptions?”4 We then offer some
“speculative possibilities that might be investigated in further
work, econometric or other,” and suggest that “[m]uch more
work should be done to examine these (and other) possibilities . . . .”5 We are thus delighted to see the game-theoretic
modeling in Part II of Appleton and Pollak’s response, which
attempts to provide exactly such a possible explanation.6 We
view this kind of modeling as a beneficial and necessary compliment to empirical testing, whereby models are suggested,
then tested, then dismissed or refined, and so on.
Third, Pollak and Appleton highlight an important assumption in our Article. As they explain, for our “challenge to
this theory to have maximum traction, adoption must be a positive institution with benefits for individual children, society, or
both. Otherwise, no one would care that IVF subsidies might
decrease adoptions—the substitution theory would not matter.”
Additionally, they note our discussion of some arguments
against international adoption and the absence of an equivalent discussion of why reduced domestic adoptions might be a
positive thing.7 They are certainly correct that if one thinks
that domestic adoptions in the U.S. are a bad thing, a possible
effect where IVF insurance mandates reduce domestic adoptions will not be troubling—indeed, perhaps a reduction in domestic adoptions will be welcomed! We viewed the work we did
in our Article as an attempt to meet those pressing the substitution theory within their own framework (that views domestic
adoption as a good thing), granting them their own assumptions and trying to show that, as normative and empirical matcreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135 (2008) (arguing against a constitutional right not
to be a genetic parent); I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not to be a Genetic Parent?,
81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115 (2008) (developing a legal framework for analyzing the
right not to be a genetic parent).
4. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 575.
5. Id. at 575–76.
6. See Appleton & Pollak, supra note 2, at 72–80.
7. Id. at 63–65.
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ters, their claims against subsidizing IVF may not follow. For
those who, perhaps like Pollak and Appleton (who do not take
ownership of this argument, just raise it), accept a more external critique that domestic adoption is not a good thing, the case
against funding IVF is obviously weaker still. Their gametheoretic modeling also posits that IVF mandates can have income effects, which can lead to an increase in adoption rates.8
This argument further reduces the case against funding IVF,
even as an internal critique.
Thus, we think very highly of Appleton and Pollak’s response and think it adds to and extends the research agenda
we have tried to initiate with our Article. We hope that many
others follow suit.
For the sake of crystallizing the issues, though, we shall
briefly identify a few places where we would characterize our
argument differently from Appleton and Pollak.
First, Appleton and Pollak write that we say “nothing to
challenge the common understanding of adoption as a ‘second
choice’ or even ‘last resort’ path to parenthood” and that “in explaining their findings, [we] hypothesize that prospective parents will try IVF before turning to adoption.”9 They appear to
be referring to a few pages of our Article where we discuss why
the substitution theory has seemed plausible to its proponents
by reviewing parts of the existing qualitative literature to
“show that infertility, and prior attempts at fertility treatments, are associated with considering adoption or actually
adopting.”10 Their critique culminates with a quotation of Professor Appleton’s own work, noting that she has “aptly observed
in interpreting and summarizing the results of these kinds of
studies” that “most couples turn to medical treatment when
first experiencing a fertility problem, reinforcing the ‘second
best’ or ‘last resort’ status of adoption.”11 It seemed quite clear
to us that these pages discuss a common descriptive claim in
the literature that Appleton has herself endorsed, and we are
not in any way offering the point as a normative argument. Indeed, in a different passage, we are explicit on the issue:
There is also a further question of whether the preference for genetic
children carries forward after adoption, or, as has been demonstrated
8. Id. at 75–80.
9. Id. at 68.
10. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 534.
11. Id. at 535 (quoting Susan Frelich Appleton, Adoption in the Age of Reproductive Technology, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393, 426).
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with quality of life measures related to disability, whether individuals
instead “adapt” their evaluations to some extent. Does that adaptation occur for all potential adopted children, or is it less likely to occur
with, for example, special needs children? If preference “adaptation”
does take place to some extent, which set of preferences should policy
makers “count,” the adapted or unadapted ones? An analogous problem has proven perplexing in the context of allocation debates for
scarce health resources to prevent disability, that is, whether we
should allocate resources based on unadapted or adapted quality of
life estimates for people with disabilities. Finally, there is the question of whether the negative effects of being denied genetic reproduction could successfully be reduced by widespread attempts to deemphasize the importance of the genetic connection in parenting.
Given the long history of this preference and its centrality in many religious traditions, we think such preference reprogramming is unlikely in the foreseeable future.12

Second, at several junctures, Appleton and Pollak take issue with our consideration of whether IVF falls within normative conceptions of health and the state’s obligations to promote
it. Most notably, they state that:
By portraying infertility as a health impairment (“deviations [from]
species-typical normal functioning”), Cohen and Chen naturalize conception, pregnancy, childbirth, and repronormativity itself. Although
this move helps them arrive at their narrow normative destination,
this notion of “normal functioning” undercuts arguments for insurance subsidies for contraception, which have encountered some notable pushback in recent times. And, of course, the legal status of abortion, not to mention abortion subsidies, remains highly contested.13

We think this misses our argument in two ways. First,
Norman Daniels’s theory of an obligation to promote health as
defined as species-typical functioning is offered by us as one of
five different rationales for covering IVF, alongside Martha
Nussbaum’s Capabilities Theory, welfarist-consequentialist
moral theories, disability-rights theories, and narrower health
outcomes and dollars and cents approaches.14 Thus, one can
easily support IVF insurance mandates or even a conception of
infertility as a health care need without necessarily subscribing
to the species-typical functioning approach. Indeed, we are explicit about this in our normative discussion of the substitution

12. Id. at 518; see also id. at 506 (noting the argument “that government
programs to expand access to IVF have the problematic expressive effect of
reinforcing the centrality of biological ties for family, or will further undermine the self-worth of infertile women who try IVF and fail”).
13. Appleton & Pollak, supra note 2, at 71–72 (quoting Cohen & Chen,
supra note 1, at 517).
14. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 501–05.
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theory where we run the argument twice.15
Moreover, even if one were committed to the species-typical
functioning approach it is not clear that it problematically
“naturalize[s]
conception,
pregnancy,
childbirth,
and
repronormativity itself ” or that it necessarily creates problems
for Pollak and Appleton’s preferred policy outcomes for abortion
and contraception.16 Without giving a full articulation or defense of Daniels’s approach, we note at one point in the paper
that whether some people want or do not want a procedure does
not determine whether that procedure is truly a health need,
nor does it affect our obligation to make it available to those
who do want it.17 It is true that Daniels has acknowledged in
earlier work that, under his theory, “[n]on-therapeutic abortions do not count as health-care needs, since unwanted pregnancy is not a disease,” such that “if medicaid has as its only
legitimate function the meeting of health-care needs of the
poor, then we cannot argue for funding abortions as we do for
funding other medical procedures which treat diseases.”18 However, as Daniels writes, “if Medicaid should serve other important goals, like ensuring that poor and well-off women can
equally well control their bodies, then there is justification for
funding these abortions,” as well as an argument that not funding these abortions “will contribute to other health problems
induced by illegal abortions or by the lack of adequate prenatal
care for poor, teenaged girls.”19 This rationale for funding these
abortions makes eminent sense when understood against Daniels’s larger theory: that protecting health is important as a
way of furthering the larger goal of ensuring that all have access to the “normal opportunity range” that is “the array of life
plans reasonable persons are likely to develop for themselves.”20
Third, in a few places Appleton and Pollak suggest we have
failed to acknowledge important drawbacks to subsidizing IVF.
They write that we “assume—in [their] view, rather too readi15. See id. at 509–26; see, e.g., id. at 518 (“Now suppose one rejects the
classification of infertility treatment as part of ‘health,’ or—contrary to Daniels, Nussbaum, and others—rejects the premise that government has any
special obligations to further the health of its citizens.”).
16. Appleton & Pollack, supra note 2, at 71–72.
17. Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 515–16.
18. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 31–32 (1985).
19. Id. at 32.
20. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY
43–46 (2008).
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ly—that establishing that a procedure promotes health suffices
to make the case for public subsidies or mandates, without considering cost as well as benefit,” that “[s]trengthening the theoretical foundation for access to IVF, without attending to questions of contraception and abortion, profoundly threatens
gender equality, which even liberal feminism embraces.”21 They
claim that “[t]hese are serious problems for women that extend
well beyond what Cohen and Chen describe as ‘radical feminist
critiques of IVF.’”22
In fact, we do, at several places in our Article, discuss the
costs of subsidizing IVF apart from effects on adoption. We are
most explicit in doing so in the portion where we discuss the
large number of possible reasons other than the substitution
theory that one might offer against subsidizing IVF. Indeed,
the last words of the Article are, “the concern about effects on
adoption is but one reason to oppose these mandates, and we
leave full examination of other possible reasons to oppose these
mandates for further work.”23 In the Article itself, we set out
seven other critiques of subsidizing IVF: (1) that children born
from IVF are less healthy; (2) that government programs to expand access to IVF have the problematic expressive effect of reinforcing the centrality of biological ties for family or will further undermine the self-worth of infertile women who try IVF
and fail; (3) that on some religious views, IVF problematically
separates the unitive and the procreative elements of reproduction within a marriage and/or may lead to embryo destruction;
(4) that subsidizing health care is inappropriate on libertarian
grounds; (5) that including IVF in a mandate problematically
increases health insurance costs and prices some out of the
market; (6) that satisfying infertility-related needs is inappropriate when other health care needs judged more important go
unmet; and (7) that IVF mandates confuse a health care need
with the satisfaction of a lifestyle choice.24 We are also very
clear that we do not think this list is exhaustive.25 Instead, as
we state fairly directly,
[f ]or the purpose of this Article we self-consciously put each of these
objections to one side, acknowledging that if the argument we offer
here succeeds, these objections will nonetheless persist and their persuasiveness will have to be evaluated in further work in order to de21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Appleton & Pollak, supra note 2, at 62, 72.
Id. at 72 (quoting Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 506).
Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 577.
Id. at 505–09.
Id. at 509 (“There may be other kinds of objections as well.”).
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termine the ultimate question of whether expanding IVF access
through insurance mandates is desirable.26

We go on to say that “[h]ere we instead focus on an objection from a perspective otherwise open to promoting access to
health care goods and reducing inequality—the objection that
focuses on the negative effects these mandates have on adoption.”27 Thus, Appleton and Pollak’s concerns as to equity with
contraception and abortion—which, we should hasten to add,
not every reader will find troubling—are, in our view, simply
an additional set of arguments to be evaluated before reaching
an all-things-considered view of subsidizing IVF.
Finally, Appleton and Pollak, in the game-theoretic portion
of their response, suggest we do not acknowledge the possibility
of heterogeneous responses to IVF subsidies. They argue that
“[a] proper analysis of the effect of IVF mandates requires us to
recognize that infertile couples are heterogeneous in their resources and their preferences and, hence, heterogeneous in
their responses to IVF mandates.”28 In our conclusion, we suggest just such a possibility, writing: “there may be . . . a ‘two
solitudes’ effect: individuals have preferences for or against
domestic adoption that are independent of IVF’s availability
such that they will either adopt or refuse to adopt regardless of
whether or not they have a substitutive method of having children.”29 We note that this “is in tension with much of the qualitative empirical literature reviewed earlier on adoption
decisionmaking.”30 Thus, we view Appleton and Pollak’s excellent game theoretic formalization of our suggestion on this
score as once again complimentary rather than critical. This is
exactly the kind of future empirical and theoretical work that
we have hoped our work will launch.
Small differences in characterization about our project
should not distract from what we said at the outset: we are
thrilled by the praise of such leading figures in our fields and
we think the response beautifully adds to and extends the research agenda we have tried to initiate with our Article. We
hope that many others follow suit with work as outstanding as
that of Professors Appleton and Pollak.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Appleton & Pollak, supra note 2, at 72–73.
Cohen & Chen, supra note 1, at 576.
Id.

